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Abstract
I construct a set of dynamic macroeconomic models to analyze the eﬀect of unskilled immi-
gration on wage inequality. The immigrants or their descendants do not remain unskilled–over
time they may approach or exceed the general level of educational attainment. In the baseline
model, the economy’s capital supply is determined endogenously by the savings behavior of
infinite-lived dynasties, and I also consider models in which the supply of capital is perfectly
elastic, or exogenously determined. I derive a simple formula that determines the time dis-
counted value of the skill premium enjoyed by college-educated workers following a change in
the rate of immigration for unskilled workers, or a change in the degree or rate at which unskilled
immigrants become skilled. I compare the calculations of the skill premiums to data from the
U.S. Current Population Survey to determine the long-run eﬀect of diﬀerent immigrant groups
on wage inequality in the United States.
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1 Introduction
In this paper I construct a set of macroeconomic models to analyze how increases in the number
of unskilled immigrants may aﬀect wage inequality over time. In these models, a change in
the number of such immigrants does not necessarily alter the composition of the workforce
permanently. Rather than remaining unskilled forever, a portion of the additional immigrants,
or their descendants, join the ranks of skilled workers. Indeed, as is the case for some immigrant
groups in the United States, the native-born children or grandchildren of immigrants with low
levels of education may not merely assimilate by matching the general level of educational
attainment, but exceed it.
For the baseline model, I adopt the Weil (1989) overlapping dynasties optimal growth frame-
work. Changes in immigration policy not only aﬀect wages directly by altering the size and
composition of the labor force, but also alter the rate of return to capital, inducing changes in
savings behavior that gradually aﬀect the size of the capital stock. These changes to the size of
the capital stock indirectly aﬀect wages as well. I derive a simple reduced form that encapsulates
all these diﬀerent eﬀects on one measure of wage inequality–the ratio between the discounted
values of skilled and unskilled wages.
The eﬀect of a change in immigration policy on wages is neither constant nor immediate. A
change in immigration policy generates changes in the size and composition of the population
that accumulate over time. The eﬀect of these changes on factor returns may or may not be
permanent, depending on whether the labor supplied by the immigrants or their descendents
perfectly substitutes for the pre-existing labor supply. Therefore by examining the ratio between
the discounted value of the two diﬀerent wages, I can determine to what degree, in the long run,
high educational attainment by the descendants of unskilled immigrants either ameliorates or
reverses their short-run impact on wage inequality.
In my baseline model, capital is endogenously determined but adjusts slowly. Borjas (1999)
analyzes the impact of immigration in static models under two alternative assumptions–capital
supply is either completely elastic, or fixed. To better understand the sensitivity of my measure
of wage inequality to diﬀerent assumptions about the supply of capital, I compare the behavior
of my model to one in which the stock of capital adjusts immediately to policy changes, but
where the rate of return is exogenously determined. In addition, I also consider the case where
the size of the capital stock grows at a fixed exogenous rate.
In Section 2, I briefly review recent U.S. immigration policy. I present data from the U.S.
Census Current Population Survey that demonstrates the vast diﬀerences in educational at-
tainment among diﬀerent immigrant groups–diﬀerences that span at least two generations.
These data also highlight the higher degree of intergenerational mobility between the immigrant
generation and the second generation, when compared to the analogous native populations.
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I present in Section 3 the dynamic optimal growth model with overlapping dynasties, devel-
oped by Weil (1989). Ben-Gad (2004) used the model to examine the behavior of an economy
that is absorbing immigrant dynasties over time. In this paper, I distinguish between two types
of households: households with skilled workers (college-educated adults), with unskilled workers
(adults without college degrees).
Section 4 describes the dynamic system and the general perturbations method I use to
simulate its behavior. I also derive the formula used to calculate the discounted skill premium
(the percentage gap between the present value of wages for college and non-college educated
workers) in the baseline model. I also present the explicit reduced form for the special case
where the elasticities of substitution between the factors of production are all identical.
Section 5 briefly describes two alternative assumptions about the elasticity of the capital
supply. I demonstrate that for the special case in which all the elasticities of substitution
between the inputs are identical, the ratio between the two wages at any moment in time is
identical, regardless of what mechanism governs the dynamic behavior of the capital stock.
Nonetheless, even in this case, the discounted premium to education is sensitive to the model
we choose.
In Section 6, I present my procedure for modelling the eﬀect of immigration policy on the
composition of the labor force over time. There is first, a direct eﬀect as the ratio of skilled to
unskilled workers among the extra new arrivals seldom matches the veteran population. There
is a second eﬀect because I permit the descendants of these immigrants to switch between the
two categories during the periods after they arrive. One serious limitation to this approach is
that membership in either category is determined exogenously–I am modeling the impact of
observed changes in educational attainment but make no attempt to explain them.
Section 7 explains the choice of parameters I use to calibrate the model. In Section 8, I
consider the impact of a twenty-year surge in the immigration of unskilled workers on wages
and wage inequality, within the context of three diﬀerent assumptions for the elasticity of capital
supply, and three diﬀerent specifications of the production function. I consider three diﬀerent
scenarios. First, what if the immigrants and their descendants remain permanently unskilled?
No one ever attends college, and their arrival permanently lowers the share of unskilled workers
within the economy. This scenario is a crude approximation of perhaps the most pessimistic
outcome for immigration: the creation of a permanent unskilled under class. In the second
scenario, the immigrants are initially unskilled, but over time, they or their descendents grad-
ually attain the levels of college education prevalent in the general population. This process of
immigrant ‘assimilation’ ultimately restores the distribution of college-educated and non-college
educated people in the workforce to its initial level. In the third scenario all the immigrants
or their descendents eventually attend college. This last case is perhaps the least likely, yet
paradoxically the most informative. Finally, I compare the results to those obtained for an
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identically sized influx of college-educated immigrants.
Finally, in Section 9, I consider more realistic examples, where not all immigrants are skilled
or unskilled and neither are all their descendants. I relate the results for the discounted skill
premium to the data on college attainment for the diﬀerent immigrant groups in the Current
Population Survey.
In this paper I do not presume to explain the decisions made by households to immigrate.
Because legal migration from the developing world to the developed world is regulated by the
rationing of visas, and illegal migration by the resources invested in interdiction, or the harshness
of penalties imposed on those violating immigration laws, I believe it is possible to treat modest
changes in rates of immigration for unskilled workers as exogenous policy decisions.1 More
importantly, this paper ignores the decisions made by immigrants or their descendants to acquire
education. Instead, I focus on the long-run implications of diﬀerential educational attainment
among immigrants and their descendents for wage inequality.
2 U.S. Immigration Policy and Educational Attainment Among
Immigrant Groups
2.1 The Rate of Net International Migration
The share of foreign-born within the population of the United States declined steadily between
1910 to 1970, from 14.7% to 4.7%. Since then it has climbed swiftly, reaching 11.7% by the end
of 2003. What has generated such a dramatic rise in just over three decades?
The oﬃcial rate of immigration presented in Figure 1, Panel a), features the data tabulated
by the U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. These numbers show immigration
rising steadily from a rate of 1.5 per thousand in 1960 to 2.6 per thousand in 1988, then rising
much more steeply, reaching 7.1 per thousand in 1991, and then declining to 2.3 per thousand
in 1999.
The rate at which people arrived in the United States did indeed rise between 1960 and 1991,
but not by nearly so much, nor was the rate nearly so volatile. The oﬃcial rate of immigration in
Panel a) of Figure 1 does not show the date at which foreigners arrive in the United States or join
its workforce, but merely captures the number who attain the oﬃcial status of immigrant. Hence
there was no massive influx of immigrants in 1991, but rather a large number of people, many
living and working illegally in the United States for a decade or more, who took advantage of
the amnesty provisions in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), to register
as legal immigrants.
1See Galor (1986), Djajic (1989), Borjas (1994), and Zak et. al. (2002) for models with endogenously deter-
mined levels of immigration.
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Figure 1: Annual rates per thousand, of legal immigration and components of population growth in
the United States, 1960 to 1999. Natural population growth is number of births, less deaths. Net
international migration (NIM) from 1960 to 1984 includes migration by U.S. civillians, but excludes
military personnel, NIM from 1985 to 1994 excludes both U.S. civillians and military personnel, and 1995
to 1999 NIM excludes both U.S. civillians and military personnel. The dashed gray lines correspond to
decade averages for NIM. Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division and Housing and Household
Economic Statistics Division and U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, various
years.
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Net international migration (NIM) in Figure 1 Panel b), measures the physical movement
of people between the United States and the rest of the world. The rise in the NIM was far less
dramatic than either the changes in the oﬃcial rate of immigration or the steep decline in the
rate of natural population growth in Panel b) of Figure 1.2 Between 1960 and 1999 the birth
rate in the United States dropped from 23.8 to 14.4 per thousand, causing the steep decline in
the rate of natural population growth. The sharp decline in the birth rate combined with the
gradual increase in net migration between 1970 and 2000 to generate the large increase in the
share of the foreign born within the U.S. population over the same period.
2.2 U.S. Immigration Policy
Since passage of the Immigrant and Nationality Act of 1965, most legal immigrants have ar-
rived in the United States through some form of family sponsorship. Immediate relatives of
United States citizens may enter without limit; during the 1990’s about a quarter of a million
arrived each year. Other relatives of U.S. citizens are admitted as family-sponsored preference
immigrants–the Immigration Act of 1990 set the limit for all family sponsored immigrants as
either 226,000, or 480,000 minus the number of people admitted under the category of imme-
diate relatives during the previous year, whichever is larger. The United States also allocates
140,000 employment-based preference visas for workers with special skills or training (as well
as investors), and an additional 55,000 visas are allocated by lottery under the diversity pro-
gram. Finally, the United States admits refugees and asylum seekers (refugees are admitted
from abroad on the basis of a yearly quota set annually by the president). After a year, refugees
and asylees are eligible for permanent residence–between 1991 and 2000, just over one million
gained admission.
In addition to immigration visas, in 1992 the United States began granting 65,000 H-1B
visas to temporary workers with special skills–nearly all recipients have college or advanced
degrees.3 To ameliorate a perceived shortage of qualified workers in the information technology
sector, Congress passed the American Competitiveness in theWorkforce Act of 1998, temporarily
increasing the number of H-1B visas to 115,000 per year in 1999 and 2000, and 107,500 in 2001.
The American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 (AC21) added an extra
347,500 visas by raising the cap to 195,000 for each of the years 2001, 2002, and 2003, for a total
of 585,000 H-1B visas over three years. The cap for 2004 and beyond is once again 65,000.
2Data for the rate of net international migration are available for calender years up until 1999, and for years
2001 and beyond. Data for 2000 are available for only part of the year. Therefore I compare the decades 1960-1969,
1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999.
3H-1B visas are granted for a maximum of two consecutive three-year stays. However, workers are no longer
required to demonstrate an intention to return to their home countries and most recipients are soon eligible to
apply for permanent residency. In the past at least half of those admitted under the program changed status and
ultimately became permanent residents (see Lowell (2001)).
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Figure 2: Percentage of the U.S. population with four-year college degrees by age, sex, birthplace, and
parent’s birthplace. Data for the USSR includes all respndents from any of the former republics in the
sample, the data for the UK includes respondents from Northern Ireland, and data for Portugal includes
respondents from the Azores. Pooled data for 2001, 2002, and 2003 from the U.S. Census, Current
Population Survey. Source: Miriam King, Steven Ruggles, and Matthew Sobek. Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Preliminary Version 0.1. Minneapolis: Minnesota
Population Center, University of Minnesota, 2003.
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Finally, the gross inflow of illegal immigrants is about 350,000 per year.4 The net increment
to the population from this source is smaller–eighty percent of those who leave the United
States are foreign born, and a substantial fraction of these are illegal aliens returning home. In
the year 2000 there were approximately seven million people living in the United States illegally,
of whom 1.5 million arrived between 1991 and 2000–a net inflow of 150,000 per year.5
2.3 College Attainment and Immigrant Groups
Clearly, any government considering a serious change in its immigration policy should be con-
cerned not only with the skills immigrants bring to their new country, but also with the levels of
education attained by their children–the members of the second generation. In the two graphs
in Figure 2, I pool data from the Current Population Survey of the U.S. Census for the years
2001, 2002, and 2003. The horizontal axes correspond to the share of people aged 45-64 with
four-year Bachelor’s degrees by place of birth. I sample only those immigrants who arrived
prior to 1975. So as to focus on people who have immigrated to the United States near the
beginning of their working lives, and at about the time they are establishing a household. By
restricting the sample I exclude older people whose immigration was perhaps sponsored by their
adult children–themselves immigrants to the United States.
Examining immigrants by country of origin reveals an enormous degree of heterogeneity in
the shares of people with college degrees. By this measure, male immigrants from India are the
best educated–nearly 83% have college degrees, followed by male immigrants from China with
63%. By contrast, the average share of college educated U.S. born males within the same age
group is only 31%.
Among all the males in this sample, the least educated are Mexican immigrants, of whom
just under 7% have completed college, followed by Puerto Ricans (I treat respondents who report
Puerto Rico as their birthplace as immigrants rather than natives even though they are U.S.
citizens by birth). Although formal education does not completely encompass all labor market
skills or perfectly predict labor market outcomes, it is not hard to imagine the direct impact of
these immigrants from Mexico or Puerto Rico on the wages of unskilled workers in the United
States. Indeed, Borjas (2003) estimates the overall wage elasticity within skill groups to be -0.4
(there are four levels of educational attainment in his model, and he also controls for labor force
experience).
By contrast the arrival of highly educated immigrants from India or China is likely to depress
the wages of skilled workers. Abstracting from the overall level of wages, further immigration
4U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Oﬃce of Immigration Statisitics, 2002 Yearbook of Immigration
Statistics.
5U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Oﬃce of Policy and Planning, Estimates of the Unauthorized
Immigration Population Residing in the United States: 1990 to 2000.
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from India or China is likely to lower the wage premium enjoyed by male college graduates,
whereas immigration from Mexico and Puerto Rico is likely to enhance it. Furthermore, the
impact of each particular group of immigrants on the composition of the labor force and wage
inequality is likely to last long after the immigrants themselves retire.
To understand what this means, consider the vertical axes of the graphs in Figure 2. These
measure the rate of college completion among U.S. born individuals aged 25-44, according to
the birthplace of their fathers (for men) or mothers (for women). These are members of a
second generation, counterparts to the immigrant generation whose rates of college education
are measured on the horizontal axis.
Notice that in the upper panel of Figure 2, the points representing Mexico, Puerto Rico and
India are above, but fairly close to the solid grey 45◦ line through the origin, and the point
representing China is not too far from it either. If we treat the younger people in our sample,
represented on the vertical axes as surrogates for the children of the immigrant cohort on the
horizontal axes, we can conclude that the impact of each immigrant group on the share of college
educated within the population is fairly constant over the course of at least two generations.
This does not mean that their quantitative impact on wages is constant–the overall level of
wages, and under some circumstances the ratio between wages for skilled and unskilled workers,
is very dependent on the rate of adjustment of the capital stock to any surge in immigration.
Nonetheless, qualitatively, we can confidently predict the impact on wage inequality generated
by each of these four immigrant groups across at least two generations and probably more.6
This confidence quickly dissipates when we consider some of the other groups represented in
Figure 2, or worse still, when we attempt to compare between them. Among male immigrants
from Poland in our sample, only 21% have college degrees–well below the average for the pop-
ulation as a whole. Yet the levels of college graduation among young American-born sons of
Polish-born fathers are immediately below the high levels attained by their Indian and Chinese
counterparts–59% in the sample completed college. How do we compare the impact of male
immigrants from places like Poland, with their high levels of intergenerational upward mobility,
with the impact of better educated immigrants from Colombia, Cuba, Germany, Ireland, Italy
or the United Kingdom? How much does it matter that the children of these more-educated im-
migrants seem to experience relatively little upward mobility, and graduate from college at lower
rates than men whose fathers are from Poland? Indeed, what about immigrants from Canada,
the Philippines or the former USSR? There we see a slight drop across the two generations in
the share who report completing college.
Chiswick (1978) found that controlling for various factors, including age, and schooling,
immigrants to the United States earn more than their native counterparts provided they have
6Considering recent studies on intergenerational mobility (see the survey by Solon (1999)) or the model of
ethnic capital estimated by Borjas (1992), these eﬀects are likely to be felt in the third generation and beyond.
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worked in the U.S. for a long enough period of time. If we interpret this finding as a measure
of motivation, it would seem that some of this motivation spills over to the next generation or
is expressed in a greater eﬀort by immigrant parents to provide a college education for their
children. Among males, the Polish immigrant group presents the most obvious example of this
phenomenon. However, nearly all the points in Figure 2 cluster along a regression line (R2 = .68)
above the 45◦ line.7
The intergenerational outcomes for the women among these same immigrant groups in the
lower panel of Figure 2 are far less predictable. Consider female immigrants from Greece. In
terms of college completion, they are as a group the second least educated people in our sample.
Less than four percent of this group have college degrees, while among the American-born women
between the ages of 45 and 64 in our sample, the rate of college completion is 25%. Indeed,
only women born in Portugal have lower rates of college completion (.5%). Yet the point in
the lower panel of Figure 2 corresponding to Greece is well above the 45◦ line. This is because
just under 60% of second generation American born women aged 25 to 44 who report having
Greek-born mothers completed college, twice the rate of daughters of American-born women
in the same age group, and behind only women with mothers from China, India, and Poland.
What does the arrival of immigrants like these women from Greece mean for wage inequality in
the U.S. over time? Which dominates, the low levels of education in the first, or the high levels
of education in the second generation and perhaps beyond?
3 Immigration in a model with endogenous capital accumula-
tion
Suppose there are only two types of workers in the economy, either skilled or unskilled, and each
supplies a distinct labor input. These workers are members of infinite-lived households that
grow in size at a constant rate, and the number of these households is constantly augmented by
immigration.
To model an economy with both natural population growth and immigration, we treat each
resident as a member of an infinite-lived immigrant dynasty. In the absence of uncertainty, the
behavior of each new immigrant of type i, and all of his or her descendants, can be characterized
as the maximization of the dynasties’ infinite horizon discounted utility function beginning at
time s:
max
ci
Z ∞
s
e(ρ−n)(s−t) ln ci (s, t) dt, i ∈ {U, S} , (1)
subject to a time t budget constraint:
·
ki(s, t) = wi(t)li + (r(t)− n) ki(s, t)− ci(s, t), ∀s, t, i ∈ {U, S} , (2)
7However we cannot reject the null hypothesis that its slope is equal to one.
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where ci(s, t),and ki (s, t) represent the time t consumption and holdings of capital of the mem-
bers of a type i dynasty with arrival date s; wi(t) and r(t) represent their time t wages and the
rate of return of capital; ρ is the subjective discount rate; and n is the rate of natural population
increase–the rate of growth of the dynasties themselves.
The consumption rule for dynasty s at time t is:
ci(s, t) = (ρ− n) [ωi(t) + ki(s, t)] , ∀s, t, i ∈ {U, S} , (3)
where ωi(t) =
R∞
t e
−
R u
t r(v)dvwi(u)lidu is the present discounted value of all future income from
labor of type i from time t forward. Immigrant households of type i enter the economy at time t
at a rate of mi (t), and we assume that all immigrants arrive in their new homeland. Aggregate
consumption and capital evolve according to:
C˙i (t) = (ρ− n) [r(t) (Ωi (t) +Ki (t))− Ci (t) + Pi(t)mi (t)ωi (t) ] , i ∈ {U, S} , (4)
·
Ki (t) = wi(t)Li (t) + r(t)Ki (t)− Ci (t) (5)
where Ci(t), Ki(t), and Ωi (t) are, respectively, the time t consumption, physical capital holdings,
and the present value of future earnings aggregated over all the households with skill-level i;
Mi (s) is the number of households with skill-level i, that have accumulated by time s; and
Pi (s) = en(t−b)Mi (s) represents the overall size of each portion of the population.8 The total
labor input supplied by a household of type i ∈ {U,S} at time t is li, and the total supply of
each type is Li (t) = Pi (t) li , i ∈ {U,S}.
The production function F : R3 → R has constant returns to scale in both types of labor
and aggregate capital. Factors receive their marginal products:
r(t) = FK (kU (t) + η (t) kS (t) , lU , η (t) lS)− δ, (6)
wi(t) = FHi (kU (t) + η (t) kS (t) , lU , η (t) lS) , (7)
where η (t) = PS (t) /PU (t) is the ratio of households with skilled workers to unskilled workers
in the economy at time t, and δ is the rate of depreciation for physical capital.
The behavior of the economy is determined by four laws of motion for per-capita consumption
ci (t) =
Ci(t)
Pi(t)
and capital ki (t) =
Ki(t)
Pi(t)
:
·
ci (t) = (r(t)− ρ) ci (t)− (ρ− n) ki (t)mi (t)κi (t) i ∈ {U, S} , (8)
8Define t = b as a date in the arbitrarily distant past b < 0, when the economy was founded by an initial
cohort of size MU (b)+MS (b). Then Ci(t), Ki(t), and Ωi(t) are the consumption, capital and the future earnings
for the initial type i population at time b, and all the additional cohorts accumulated at rate mi (s) since b,
all growing at the rate of n. Hence Ci(t)=en(t−b)
R t
b Mi (s)mi (s) ci(s, t)ds+e
n(t−b)Mi (b) ci(b, t), Ki(t) =en(t−b)R t
b Mi (s)mi (s) ki(s, t)ds+e
n(t−b)Mi (b) ki(b, t), Ωi (t)=en(t−b)
³R t
b Mi (s)mi (s) ds+Mi (b)
´
ωi (t), and Mi (s) =
e
R s
b mi(v)dv.
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·
ki (t) = wi(t)li + (r(t)− n−mi (t)κi (t)) ki (t)− ci (t) i ∈ {U, S} , (9)
where κi (t) = (ki (t)− ki (t, t)) /ki (t) is the fractional diﬀerence between per-capita capital
holdings and the capital immigrants bring with them.
In our simulations we analyze the model using a family of production functions whose most
general expression is the nested constant elasticity of substitution (nested CES) aggregate pro-
duction function with constant returns to scale developed by Sato (1967):
F (K (t) , LU (t) , LS (t)) =
h
(1− α)LU (t)ϑ + α (βK (t)υ + (1− β)LS (t)υ)
ϑ
υ
i 1
ϑ
, (10)
where K (t) = KU (t) +KS (t) is the total stock of capital.9
4 The Dynamic System, and the Discounted Skill Premium
The sets of equations (8) and (9) for each skill-type are very similar, as the savings and consump-
tion decisions of each type of household in the economy are not very diﬀerent from each other.
Finding a suﬃciently precise approximation of the saddle path that corresponds to this dynamic
system is very diﬃcult because the condition number of the Jacobian matrix of the linearized
system is very high. To overcome this problem, we define the variables aU (t) = ln c˜U (t) and
χ (t) = ωS(t)ωU (t) , which equals
cS(t)−(ρ−n)kS(t)
cU (t)−(ρ−n)kU (t) , and replace the two laws of motion for consumption
(8) with:
a˙U (t) = r(t)− ρ− (ρ− n) e−aU (t)kU (t)mU (t)κU (t) (11)
χ˙ (t) = (ρ− n) χ (t)wU (t)−wS (t)
eaU (t) − (ρ− n) kU (t)
(12)
·
kU (t) = wU (t) + (r(t)− n−mU (t)κU (t)) kU (t)− eaU (t) (13)
·
kS (t) = wS(t) + (r(t)− ρ−mS (t)κS (t)) kS (t) +
³
(ρ− n) kU (t)− eaU (t)
´
χ (t) (14)
Redefining the variables of the system has an additional benefit. The variable χ (t) directly
expresses the ratio between the discounted values of all the future skilled and unskilled wages.
In steady state, rates of immigration for skilled and unskilled must be equal–we employ
perturbation methods (see Judd (1998)) to study the dynamic behavior of the model following
temporary changes in the flow of skilled or unskilled immigrants.10 Define m as the initial
9Also known as the two stage CES production function. The first stage combines skilled labor and raw capital
to develop and maintain production capital: K∗ = (λKν + (1− λ) (HS)ν)
1
ν . K∗ is used by unskilled labor in
the second stage to manufacture final goods: Y =
h
µ (HU )ϑ + (1− µ) (K∗)ϑ
i 1
ϑ . See Goldin and Katz (1998).
10The general theory of perturbations was first developed by Euler, Laplace, and most importantly Lagrange
in the late 18th century to study celestial mechanics. The movement of a planet around the sun was ‘perturbed’
from its eliptical orbit by the gravitational pull of other planets which varied over time (Ekeland (1988)). Judd
(1982), (1985) introduced perturbations to economics to study fiscal policy where the perturbations are changes
in tax rates. Here changes in immigration policy perturbs the economy from its balanced growth path.
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steady state rate of immigration, and replace mi (t) in (11)-(14) with m + πi (t), where πi (t)
is a bounded dynamic perturbation to the rate of migration by type-i workers, and  is a small
positive number that regulates its magnitude. Similarly we define η as the steady-state ratio
of skilled to unskilled workers and replace the the terms σ (t) with η + ξ (t), where ξ (t) is a
bounded dynamic perturbation to the skill ratio.
Defining π (t) = {πS (t) , πU (t)}∞t=0, consumption and capital for each skill-type are all func-
tions of π, ξ and .11 We diﬀerentiate (8), (9) with respect to  at the point  = 0:


∂
∂
·
aU (t, , π, ξ)
∂
∂ χ˙(t, , π, ξ)
∂
∂
·
kU (t, , π, ξ)
∂
∂
·
kS(t, , π, ξ)


= J


∂
∂aU (t, , π, ξ)
∂
∂χ(t, , π, ξ)
∂
∂kU (t, , π, ξ)
∂
∂kU (t, , π, ξ)

−


(ρ− n) e−aUkUκUπU (t)
0
kUκUπU (t)
kSκSπS (t)

−


ΩK
(ρ−n)(χlUΩU−lSΩS)
eaU−(ρ−n)kU
kUΩK + lUΩU
kSΩK + lSΩS

 ξ (t) ,
(15)
where J is a 4×4 Jacobian matrix; aU , χ, kU , and kS are the initial steady state values of log
consumption, the ratio between the present values of skilled and unskilled wages, and capital;
and ΩK = lS ∂
2F
∂LS∂K
+ kS ∂
2F
∂K∂K , ΩU = lS
∂2F
∂LS∂LU
+ kS ∂
2F
∂K∂LU
, ΩS = lS ∂
2F
∂LS∂LS
+ kS ∂
2F
∂K∂LS
.
To better understand how immigration aﬀects the behavior of the model, I divide the shocks
in (15) between two separate vectors that operate autonomously. The first contains the terms κU
and κS, and if positive [negative] reflects the eﬀects of capital dilution [enhancement] generated
by the arrival of capital-poor [rich] immigrants, as described by Borjas (1995) in his static
model and Ben-Gad (2004) in a dynamic setting. The terms ΩK , ΩU , and ΩS in the second
shock vector, capture those changes in the returns to capital, unskilled wages, and skilled wages
respectively, that result from the change in the composition of the labor force, i.e. ξ (t).
The portion of a policy change that operates through the channel represented by the first
vector are completely transitory if the shocks have bounded support. Even permanent changes
in the rate of immigration produce few changes in factor returns, or in the welfare of the
native population. By contrast, the second vector can generate permanent changes in the
economy even if the policy changes it represents are transitory. Small diﬀerences in the rate of
immigration between the two types of immigrants accumulate over time, and permanently aﬀect
the composition of the labor force. Only if the value of all the perturbations operating through
the second vector is zero in the limit–as will be the case if immigrant dynasties gradually
assimilate until they replicate the overall skill distribution–do all the variables in the economy
return to their original steady-state values.
11To guarantee convergence to an interior balanced growth path we also impose the restriction on πS (t) and
πU (t) that they must satisfy
¯¯¯
lim
T→∞
R T
0
(πS (t)− πU (t)) dt
¯¯¯
<∞
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We solve (15) using Laplace Transforms:


Lv
£
∂
∂aU (t, , π, ξ)
¤
Lv
£
∂
∂χ(t, , π, ξ)
¤
Lv
£ ∂
∂kU (t, , π, ξ)
¤
Lv
£
∂
∂kU (t, , π, ξ)
¤

 (16)
= (vI− J)−1




∂
∂aU (0, , π, ξ)
∂
∂χ(0, , π, ξ)
0
0

−


(ρ− n) e−aUkUκULv [πU ]
0
κUkULv [πU ]
κSkSLv [πS]

−


ΩK
(ρ−n)(χlUΩU−lSΩS)
eaU−(ρ−n)kU
kUΩK + lUΩU
kSΩK + lSΩS

Lv [ξ]


where ∂∂aU (0, , π, ξ) and
∂
∂χ(0, , π, ξ) are the initial changes in the values of the two control
variables12. The matrix J has four eigenvalues, two negative and two positive. Define the two
positive eigenvalues as µ1 and µ2. Each element of the left-hand vector must be bounded for
any positive value v, including the eigenvalues µ1 and µ2, and yet the determinants |µhI − J|,
h ∈ {1, 2} are zero by definition. The only way for (16) to be bounded when v=µh , h ∈ {1, 2}
is for the numerator, the adjoint of µhI − J, h ∈ {1, 2} multiplied by the term in parentheses,
to be equal to zero:
adj [µhI− J]




∂
∂aU (0, , π, ξ)
∂
∂χ(0, , π, ξ)
0
0

−


(ρ− n) e−aUkUκULµh [πU ]
0
κUkULµh [πU ]
κSkSLµh [πS]

−


ΩK
ρ−n(χlUΩU−lSΩS)
eaU−(ρ−n)kU
kUΩK + lUΩU
kSΩK + lSΩS

Lµh [ξ]


= 0, h ∈ {1, 2} (17)
both of which can then be solved for the values of ∂∂aU (0, , π, ξ) and
∂
∂χ(0, , π, ξ).
Whereas the evolution of χ(t), the ratio between the present discounted value of skilled and
unskilled wages, is not of particular interest, (19)–the change in its value at time t = 0–gives
us all the relevant information for determining how a change in immigration aﬀects discounted
wage inequality over time–without explicitly calculating the impulse responses for wages or
the rate of return to capital following a policy announcement. The discounted skill (or college)
premium SP is the percentage diﬀerence between the present discounted value of skilled and
unskilled wages:
SP =
µ
χ+ 
∂
∂
χ(0, , π, ξ)− 1
¶
× 100 (18)
where χ is once again the initial steady-state value of χ(t).
The first element in the second row of matrix J is zero. The third and fourth are zero as
well, if the elasticities of substitution between the various inputs in the production function are
equal–if υ = ϑ in (10), only the diagonal element J22 of the second row of matrix J is non-zero,
which is one of the two positive eigenvalues. Hence, the value of ∂∂χ(0, , π, ξ) is the second
12The Laplace transform of a function f(t) and a positive number v is Lv [f ] =
R∞
0
f (t) e−vtdt.
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element in the third vector in (17), where the eigenvalue is J22 = ρ− n:
∂
∂
χ(0, , π, ξ) = −(ρ− n) (χlUΩU − lSΩS)
eaU − (ρ− n) kU
Z ∞
0
e−(ρ−n)tξ (t) dt (19)
Result 1 If the elasticities of substitution between all the inputs are equal, the discounted skill
premium is not a function of capital dilution κU and κS.
Result 1 tells us that even though the rate of return to capital is aﬀected by changes in
immigration policy, for the special case of Cobb-Douglas or CES production, capital dilution
itself has no eﬀect on the discounted wage gap. A surge in immigration of type i certainly lowers
the wages of all the workers of type i in the economy as long as the values of κU and κS are
not negative. The wages of type j 6= i may either rise or fall depending on whether the relative
scarcity of this type of labor has a stronger eﬀect than the decline in per-capita capital. Either
way, as long as the elasticity of substitution between the inputs is constant, we can separate
the analysis of the discounted skill premium from the eﬀects on the economy generated by the
dilution of the capital stock.
If F is CRS and all the inputs are complementary in production, Fij > 0 for all i 6= j then
ΩU > 0 and ΩS < 0. Furthermore
(ρ−n)
eaU−(ρ−n)kU = 1/ωU (t), the inverse value of the per-capita
present value of unskilled wages.
Result 2 If the elasticities of substitution between all the inputs are equal, the production func-
tion is CRS and all the inputs are complementary in production, the college premium increases
[decreases] if the present value of the shock ξ (t), discounted by ρ− n, is negative [positive].
From Result 2 we know how skilled and unskilled workers fare relative to each other, but
we do not know what happens to the overall level of wages in the economy. To calculate the
dynamic behavior of the wage levels we need to know the evolution of capital over time. We
apply the inverse Laplace transforms to (16):


∂
∂aU (t, , π, ξ)
∂
∂χ(t, , π, ξ)
∂
∂kU (t, , π, ξ)
∂
∂kU (t, , π, ξ)

 = e
Jt


∂
∂aU(0, , π, ξ)
∂
∂χ(0, , π, ξ)
0
0

 (20)
−
Z t
0
eJ(t−q)


(ρ− n) e−aUkUκUπU (q)
0
kUκUπU (q)
kSκSπS (q)

 dq −
Z t
0
eJ(t−q)


ΩKξ (q)
(ρ−n)(χlUΩU−lSΩS)
eaU−(ρ−n)kU ξ (q)
(kUΩK + lUΩU ) ξ (q)
(kSΩK + lSΩS) ξ (q)

 dq.
The time path of capital is approximated by ki(t, , π, ξ) ≈ ki +  ∂∂ki(t, , π, ξ), i ∈ {U,S}, and
to determine the time path of each wage in isolation, as well as the rate of return to capital, we
insert ki(t, , π, ξ) together with the time path of η (t) into (6)-(7).
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5 Inelastic and Perfectly Elastic Capital Supply
In the literature on immigration, capital supply is usually treated in one of two ways (see Borjas
(1999)). One approach is to assume that changes in the supply of labor do not induce changes in
the stock of capital–i.e., the capital stock is fixed. The other approach is to assume that capital
flows freely between countries, and the capital stock adjusts immediately to accommodate the
arrival of new immigrants. If capital is fixed, or in the case of this model, constrained to grow
at the constant baseline rate of population growth m + n, the wage responses to changes in
immigration will generally be very strong, and changes in the rate of return to capital will be
large and permanent. By contrast, if capital adjustment is instantaneous, the rate of return to
capital is fixed exogenously, and if labor is completely homogenous, immigration does not aﬀect
wages either. Of course, in models with heterogenous labor, a surge in immigration that upsets
the composition of the labor force will alter wages.
The model developed in Sections 3 and 4 stakes out a middle position between these two
extremes. Capital is neither fixed, nor does it adjust immediately. Instead it accumulates
gradually through the savings decisions of the agents in the economy. In the long run, the rate
of return to capital is fixed as in the open economy–a function of time preference. In the short
run, the rate of return to capital does respond to changes in the flow of immigration, and these
changes induce changes in savings behavior and the accumulation of capital.
To better understand the diﬀerent implications of what we assume about the capital supply,
set υ = ϑ in (10). The result is a constant elasticity of substitution production function, where α
and β control the relative shares of the three inputs, and the elasticity of substitution between
each pair of inputs is σUS=σUK = σSK = 11−ϑ . >From (7), factors receive their marginal
products and the wages under CES production reduce to:
w0S(t) = ϑα (1− β)LS (t)ϑ−1 /Y (t) (21)
w0U (t) = ϑ (1− α)LU (t)ϑ−1 /Y (t) (22)
where Y (t) is total output. Dividing (21) by (22), the ratio of the two wages, the instantaneous
college premium, is identical regardless of what we assume about the supply of capital.
Result 3 If the production function is CES, shocks ξ (t) and π (t) induce the same changes in
the instantaneous college premium if capital is fixed, perfectly elastic, or endogenously supplied.
Does this mean that the endogeneity of the capital supply is only relevant for determining
the wage level or the discounted college premium SP if the elasticities of substitution between
the inputs are not equal? No. First, the total levels of output Y (t) in (21) and (22) will diﬀer
depending on what we assume about the nature of the capital supply. Hence, even if wage
ratios are identical, wage levels are not. Second, the rate at which we discount the evolution of
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each wage over time, the rate of return to capital less the natural rate of population growth, is
sensitive to what we assume about the supply elasticity of capital.
What we assume about capital supply does not aﬀect the ratio between the two wages,
but does aﬀect the ratio between their discounted values. Nonetheless, the ratio between the
present values of each stream of wages is likely to be close to each other when the elasticity
of substitution is constant, even if neither the levels of these wages nor the rate at which each
is discounted is the same. Indeed the lower the elasticity of substitution, the smaller the gap
between the rate of return to capital under free capital flows and endogenous capital supply,
and the smaller the diﬀerence in the discounted college premium.
6 Modelling the Impact of Immigration and Educational At-
tainment Over Time
Most of the empirical work that measures the performance of immigrants and their families
focuses on labor market outcomes–either the wages they command when they work, or their
rates of employment. Work by Chiswick (1978), (1986), Borjas (1985), (1987), (1992), and
Card, DiNardo, and Estes (2000) document the earnings of immigrants to the United States
and work by Altonji and Card (1991), Borjas et. al. (1997) and Johannsson et. al. (2003)
focus on employment. My focus here is on educational attainment as a proxy for labor market
skills (see Jasso, Rosensweig, and Smith (2000) for a discussion). Wages in the model derive
directly from that. In addition, I am interested in the educational attainment not only of
the immigrants themselves, but of their descendants. Recent empirical work on assimilation,
and more particularly on educational attainment in the second generation, includes Gang and
Zimmerman (2000), Riphahn (2003) (both study Germany), and van Ours and Veenman (2003)
(who study the Netherlands).
My focus here is on unskilled immigrants and their children. Immigrants with baccalaureate
degrees remain educated to the end of their lives, while only a small number of uneducated people
who arrive in North America, Australia or Western Europe as adults, subsequently complete
college. From Figure 2 we see that most of the points are above the 45◦ line, suggesting that
at least some of the children of unskilled immigrants do attend college. Indeed comparing the
educational outcomes of the diﬀerent immigrant groups to the most convenient reference point–
the older generation of U.S. natives and the children of U.S. natives–there seems to be far more
upward mobility among the immigrants. Bauer and Riphahn (2004) observe a similar pattern
when comparing educational attainment among the native Swiss population with that of second
generation immigrants to Switzerland, using micro-level data that includes direct measurement
of parental education.
The immigration flows of each type and the relative size of the two types of the population,
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are clearly related, and yet we distinguish throughout between the two. In an economy without
assimilation, a surge of immigration, even if temporary, can permanently alter the distribution
between the two skill-types. By treating changes in the rates of immigration and changes in
the shares of the two skill types as distinct and separate shocks in (15), I distinguish between
the immediate impact of an immigrant group’s arrival, and its long-run aﬀect on the economy
as the group’s members and their families either assimilate, or exceed the general population’s
rate of college completion.
To simplify the analysis, I will assume that changes in the rates of immigration begin at
time zero, last T years and are constant over the entire period. The change in the overall rate of
immigration is defined as , and the increase in the overall population that results from the new
policy is eT − 1. The share of skilled workers within the immigration surge is ΠS (T ), and the
share of unskilled workers in the immigration surge is ΠU (T ) = 1−ΠS (T ). Beginning at time
Q, some of these workers, or their descendants, shift between the two categories. By time V the
share of skilled workers within this population stabilizes at ΠS (V ), and the share of unskilled
workers is ΠU (V ) = 1−ΠS (V ). Define a set of dynamic perturbations:
πi (x, j) =
1
T
ln
"
1 +
¡
eT − 1
¢
Πi (j)
Pi (0)
#
U (T − x) , i ∈ {U,S} , j ∈ {T, V } . (23)
where the unit step indicator function U : R → {0, 1} returns the value of one for all num-
bers greater than, or equal to zero, and the value zero for all numbers less than zero. The
perturbations directly aﬀect the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers in the economy:
λ (t, j) =
η (0)

³
e
R t
0 (πS(x,j)−πU (x,j))dx − 1
´
, j ∈ {T, V } . (24)
The perturbation to the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers η (t) is the sum of two components:
ξ (t) = λ (t, T ) +
·
(t−Q)U (t−Q)− (t− V )U (t− V )
Q− V
¸
(λ (V, V )− λ (T, T )) (25)
We replace the perturbations πi (t) , i ∈ {U, S} in (15)—(20) with πi (t, T ) , i ∈ {U, S} . These
represent the actual perturbations to the rates of immigration, whereas the terms πi (x, V )
i ∈ {U,S} correspond to a counterfactual policy under which the shares of skilled and unskilled
households within the population of additional immigrants are ΠS (V ) and ΠU (V ) , in the short
run and not merely in the long run. The first component in (25), λ (t, T ) , expresses the direct
cumulative eﬀect of the actual changes in immigration flows, and λ (V, V ) expresses the long-run
eﬀect of the additional immigration, after they have completed their shift from the initial rate
of college attainment Πi (T ) to the final rate Πi (V ) , i ∈ {U,S}.
The first component of ξ (t), λ (t, T ), expresses the initial, direct eﬀect of the immigration
surge on the composition of the work force from the moment the new immigration policy is
announced till time T , when the immigration surge has concluded. If λ (T, T ) > 0, then the
share of skilled workers among the additional immigrants is higher than in the local population,
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and the immigrants initially raise the value of η (t). If λ (T, T ) < 0, the share of skilled workers
is lower, and the immigrants initially lower the value of η (t). The second component in (25)
expresses movements of the immigrants between the two skill categories and their eﬀect on the
overall labor force composition between the periods Q and V .
A few examples of possible time paths for η (t) will help illustrate the behavior of the model.
The left-hand panels of Figure 3 illustrate the evolution of η (t) following a surge in unskilled
immigration only, and the right-hand panels of Figure 3 illustrate the evolution of η (t) following
a surge in skilled immigration. The black curves represent the behavior of η (t) if there is no
assimilation, the dark grey curves represent the behavior of η (t) if all the immigrants assimilate,
and the light gray curves correspond to instances where the shares of skilled and unskilled workers
within the immigrant population reverse over time.
Suppose the skill composition of the workers in the immigration surge does not match the
prevailing composition of the host country, but neither the immigrants nor their descendants
switch between the two categories after they arrive. In this case Πi (V ) = Πi (T ), i ∈ {U, S},
which implies λ (V, V ) = λ (T, T ). The second term in (25) is zero, the behavior of ξ (t) is
determined by λ (t, T ), and η (t) either declines or increases until period T , and then remains
fixed at its new steady state value. Each set of black curves in Figure 3 corresponds to the
extreme sub-cases in which an immigration surge is uniformly composed of either unskilled
(left-hand side of Figure 3) or skilled (right-hand side of Figure 3) workers. Note that in each
column the black curves are identical for diﬀerent values of Q and V , and serve as points of
reference.
Suppose the surge of additional immigrants initially upsets the balance between skilled and
unskilled workers in the labor force, but gradually, over the time period between Q and V , these
immigrants assimilate until the shares of skilled and unskilled workers exactly mimics that of
the general population. Under this scenario Πi (V ) = Πi (T ) = Pi (0), i ∈ {U,S} and therefore
λ (V, V ) = 0. Consider a surge in unskilled immigration. If the process of assimilation begins
immediately and ends soon after the last of the additional immigrants arrive (Panel a) of Figure
3), the dark grey curve barely declines below its initial value. In Panel c) assimilation begins
immediately, but the process lasts longer and the decline in η (t) is steeper.
Immigrants, or more likely their descendants, may not merely assimilate. As we see in
Figure 2, few of the women among Greek immigrants to the United States have college degrees,
but a disproportionate fraction of second-generation Greek-American women do. Similarly, the
value of η (t) may first decline because of a surge of unskilled immigration, but rise above its
initial value by time V . Similarly it is possible (though a good deal less likely) that a surge in
immigration may initially raise, but ultimately lower the value of η (t). If the value of Q is set
above T , then the value of η (t) first behaves according to λ (t, T ), before beginning its ascent
(the light gray curves in Panel g) of Figure 3) or descent (the light gray curves in Panel h) of
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Figure 3: The time paths of η (t), the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers, for diﬀerent degrees of
assimilation following diﬀerent influxes of skilled and unskilled immigrants.
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Preferences, Technology and Factor Shares:
ρ = .0495 Matches average rate of return on capital of 5%.
δ = .061 Average rate of depreciation on capital: 1991-2000.†
α=.283 Average U.S. capital’s share of national income: 1991-2000.†
β=.482 Matches ratio of initial earnings.†‡§
Population:
n = .0067 Average U.S. natural rate of population growth: 1991-2000.‡
mS= mU= .0034 Average U.S. rate of net migration: 1991-2000.‡
κS= κU= 1 Immigrants arrive without physical capital.
PS (0)=.256 Population with college degrees.‡
d = 2.7 Ratio of initial earnings and wealth.
for households with/without college degrees.‡§
Table 1: Paramaterization of Baseline Model. †Bureau of Economic Analysis. ‡U.S. Census Bureau.
§1998 Survey of Consumer Finances.
Figure 3). However if the value of V is no longer zero, but below T , then the reversal in the
direction of η (t) begins at time Q (the light gray curves in Panel e) or Panel f) of Figure 3). If
Q=0, then as in Panels a), b), and c) the direction of η (t) may be completely determined by
the value of Πi (V ).
7 Parameterizing the Model
Between 1990 and 1999 the net rate of migration to the United States was just under 3.2 per
thousand. Although a much larger fraction of immigrants have less than nine years of schooling,
the percentage of the foreign-born with baccalaureate degrees closely matches that of the general
population–25.8% of foreign-born people in the United States over the age of 25 have college
degrees, as compared to 25.6% of the total U.S. population. For the initial stock of skilled
and unskilled workers we set PS (0) = .256 and PU (0) = .744, and set the steady state rates
of immigration for both skill types to mS = mU = .0032.13 If the rates of legal and illegal
immigration to the United States during the decade of the 1990’s carry forward, and the rate
of out migration continues to hold steady at one per thousand, foreign migration will augment
the U.S. population with close to ten million additional people over the course of this decade.
13At the high end, graduate education declines slightly with the degree of nativity: 9.7% of the foreign born
have graduate degrees, as do 8.9% of natives with foreign-born parents, but only 8.2% of natives with native-born
parents. Grade school education rises more steeply with nativity–22.2% of the foreign-born and 10.1% of the
natives with foreign-born parents have less than nine grades of schooling (7.2% of the foreign-born have less than
five), against only 4.5% with less than nine grades among the native-born population with native parents (See
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Profile of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States:
2000, December 2001).
21
There is no readily available data on the financial assets or physical capital that new immi-
grants to the United States bring. Given the large gap in income between sending countries and
the United States, and the relative youth of most immigrants when they arrive, it is unlikely
that capital holdings for the typical immigrant, skilled or unskilled, approaches U.S. per-capita
capital holdings for either skill type. I set κS = κU = 1, which implies that after financing their
move to the United States and setting up a household, immigrants have exhausted their savings.
I also assume that both types of workers supply the same amounts of labor and set lU = lS = 1.
The ratios of mean earnings and income for households, as well as individuals, with bachelor’s
degrees to those without, range from 2.13 to 2.71, as measured by the U.S. Census. The 1998
Survey of Consumer Finances reports on net wealth as well as income and earnings. The ratio
of mean earnings is 2.35, that of income is 2.3 while net wealth is 3.3. The gap between median
earnings and wealth is smaller–2.4 versus 3.06. In steady state, the ratio of capital held by
skilled and unskilled agents must be equal to the ratio of their wages. I choose an intermediate
number 2.7, and combine this with the 1991 to 2000 average share of capital in national income,
28.3%, to set the values of the parameters in the production function for diﬀerent elasticities of
substitution.
Both the cross-country estimations of the nested CES production function (10) by Fallon
and Layard (1975) and Duﬀy et. al. (2004) and the time-series estimations using U.S. data by
Krussel et. al. (2000) and Swedish data by Lindquist (2003), find that the diﬀerence between
the values of the parameters ϑ and υ in (10) is statistically significant–implying the existence
of the capital skill complementarities first postulated by Griliches (1969).
I simulate the baseline model setting ϑ = .401 and υ = −.495 in (10) to match the estimates
by Krussel et. al. (2000) (their distinction between skilled and unskilled workers based on college
education matches my own). These parameter values correspond to elasticities of substitution
between capital and unskilled labor σUK , and between skilled and unskilled labor σUS, that are
equal to 11−ϑ =1.67, and an elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled labor σSK equal
to 11−υ = .67.
14 When ϑ is set equal to υ, the production function (10) becomes the standard
CES function with three inputs, and when both approach the value of one in the limit we have
the Cobb-Douglas function.
14The Allen Hicks partial elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labor, and between skilled
and unskilled labor are also equal to .67, but the Allen Hicks partial elasticity of substitution between capital
and skilled labor is 11−ϑ +
1
φSK
³
1
1−υ −
1
1−ϑ
´
=.36, where φSK is the combined share of skilled labor and capital.
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8 A Twenty Year Surge in Immigration
8.1 Wage Levels
Comparing the period 1980-1989, and the period 1990-1999 in Figure 1, Panel b) the rate of net
international migration rose by just over .3 per thousand. In the next two sections I consider the
implications of an additional rise of a similar magnitude, that lasts for two decades. To begin
with, let us suppose that all the additional immigrants are people without college degrees. The
overall rate of immigration rises from 3.2 to 3.5, per thousand and the rate of immigration by
the unskilled rises to just over 3.6 per thousand.
How many additional people does such a rise in immigration imply? If present trends
continue, the United States will absorb about twenty million legal and illegal immigrants over
the course of a two decades, and fifteen million of them will not have Baccalaureate degrees.
The change considered here need not entail an increase in the number of legal immigrants alone.
A slight curtailment in enforcement eﬀorts along the border could easily cause the number
of unskilled immigrants to rise by the additional seventy five thousand people per year (one
million-and-three-quarters over the course of twenty years) that we are considering here.
Consider first the eﬀect of the policy change on each type of wages when assimilation does
not occur. Setting ΠS (T ) = ΠS (V ) = 0, and the elasticities of substitution in the production
function (10) σSK = .67, and σUK = 1.67, the surge of unskilled immigration produces a
permanent change in the skill composition of the work force, and generates the changes in the
wages of unskilled workers shown in the upper left-hand corner of Figure 4. The dotted lines
represent the impulse response in an economy with an inelastic supply of capital. Here, because
of the permanent dilution of the capital stock, the long-run response of unskilled wages, a drop
of just above .35% for the Nested CES production function, is twenty percent higher than the
long-run decline in wages if capital is either completely elastic or endogenously determined. By
contrast, the rise in skilled wages of over three-tenths of a percent if capital is elastic, in the
upper left-hand corner of Figure 5, is well over twice the rise in skilled wages if capital is fixed.
The impulse responses in Figures 4 and 5 are all relatively modest because they were cal-
culated for an economy in which the elasticity of substitution between the two types of labor
is high. If the elasticity of substitution between all the inputs is lower, the eﬀect of immigra-
tion on both skilled and unskilled wages is larger. Setting all the elasticities of substitution to
two-thirds, the long-run drop in unskilled wages is close to nearly nine-tenths of a percent if
capital is fixed, and nearly sixth-tenths of a percent if capital is elastic. The long-run rise in
skilled wages is one-third of a percent if capital is fixed, and nearly twice that amount if capital
is elastic (see Figures 9 and 10 in the Appendix).
Whether or not there is free movement of capital, or if capital is elastically supplied but
only from internal savings, the long-run eﬀect on wages is always the same. The diﬀerence in
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the responses of wages is only a short-term phenomenon, and for the case of unskilled immigra-
tion, this diﬀerence is very small. In general, the response of wages if capital is endogenously
determined falls between two extremes, i.e., between the case where the capital supply grows at
an exogenous rate, and that where capital is perfectly elastic–but is much closer to the latter
than the former. Of course it must be emphasized that in the overlapping dynasties model there
is no representative consumer. Ensuring aggregability requires a logarithmic utility function,
and hence a relatively high degree of intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. If
the elasticity of substitution were lower, the accumulation of capital would be slower, and the
short-term response of wages in the case of endogenously supplied capital would not be quite so
close to the responses generated by the model with perfectly elastic capital.
The upper right-hand graphs in Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the response of wages if ΠS (T ) = 0
but ΠS (V ) = PS (0) and PS (0) = .256. In the twenty-fifth year (Q=25), five years after the
immigration surge has ended, the descendants of these additional unskilled immigrants enter the
labor force. Of these new workers 25.6% are skilled, exactly mirroring the proportion of skilled
workers within the larger population. By year forty-five (V=25) this additional population
has completely assimilated. The arrival of these additional workers dilutes capital and causes
both skilled and unskilled wages to drop in the short run, but will not aﬀect long-run wages
unless capital is inelastic. If capital supply is inelastic, unskilled wages drop by between a
third of a percent by year twenty (as in Figure 4), or just under nine-tenths of a percent
(as in the Appendix), depending on the elasticity of substitution. The drop is caused by the
combined eﬀect of an increase in the relative share of unskilled workers in the labor force,
and the overall rise in the size of the labor force itself. In the long run, as the descendants
of immigrants assimilate, only the latter of these two eﬀects remain, and the unskilled wage
recovers approximately half its short-term loss.
Wages for skilled workers initially climb, as the additional immigrants upset the balance
between skilled and unskilled workers. In each case, this change in the composition of the labor
force initially dominates the eﬀects of capital dilution. If capital supply is completely elastic
or endogenous, the skilled wage also returns to its initial level, once the immigrants or their
descendants completely assimilate.
If capital is in fixed supply, the skilled wage initially rises but ultimately declines. If σSK
= .67, and σUK = 1.67, the wage is one-tenth of a percent higher by year twenty, but then
begins to gradually decline, until it is half a percent below where it was before the new policy
was initiated. If both elasticities of substitution are two-thirds, the wage initially rises by one
third but is ultimately four-tenths of a percent lower, and if both elasticities are one the wage first
rises by two-tenths of a percent and then by half a percent, until it is three-tenths of a percent
below its initial level (see Figures 9 and 10 in the Appendix). The greater the complementarity
between skill and capital, the more capital dilution mitigates the initial rise in skilled wages
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Figure 4: Nested CES production function σSK = .67, and σUS = σUK = 1.67. Impulse response for
unskilled wages following a twenty year surge in the rate of immigration from 3.2 to 3.5 per thousand,
Q=25 and V=45. The solid, dashed, and dotted curves represent respectively, the impulse responses
generated by the model with capital supply that is elastic, completely elastic, and inelastic.
generated by the change in the composition of the labor force. In every case the permanent
dilution of the capital stock guarantees a lower skilled wage in the long run.
The lower left-hand graphs in Figures 4 and 5 are perhaps the most interesting–they show
the behavior of wages when ΠS (T ) = 0 and ΠS (V ) = 1. A surge of immigrants, all unskilled,
enter the country over the course of twenty years. Starting in year twenty-five they or their
descendants begin a remarkable transformation. Rather than merely assimilating as in the
previous experiment, this group crosses in its entirety from the skilled to the unskilled category
during the course of twenty years. Wages for unskilled workers initially decline, and wages for
skilled workers rise as these immigrants arrive and join the workforce.
Starting in year twenty, if capital is endogenous, or in year twenty-five if capital is either
inelastic or completely elastic, unskilled wages begin to rise and skilled wages to decline. If the
capital supply is completely elastic, both sets of wages pass through their original levels before
continuing to rise or decline, at precisely the same time–year thirty. If the supply of capital
is endogenous, the remaining eﬀects of capital dilution will cause unskilled wages to begin to
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Nested CES Production Function, sUK=sUS=1.67, sSK=.67
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Figure 5: Nested CES production function σSK = .67, and σUS = σUK = 1.67. Impulse response
for skilled wages following a twenty year surge in the rate of immigration from 3.2 to 3.5 per thousand,
Q=25 and V=45. The solid, dashed, and dotted curves represent respectively, the impulse responses
generated by the model with capital supply that is elastic, completely elastic, and inelastic.
decline below their original level during the second half of the twenty ninth year–approximately
half a year before skilled wages have completely recovered. If capital supply is exogenous, the
gap between the point when skilled wages reach their initial level and the moment when unskilled
wages have completely recovered will be much larger–the former occurs between year twenty-six
or twenty-seven (depending on the elasticities of substitution), and the latter at year thirty-five.
This gap of a few years, when both wages are below their initial levels, directly results from
capital dilution.
In the long run, wages in the lower left-hand sides of Figures 4 and 5 are identical to the
long-run wages in the lower right-hand sides. The latter represent the behavior of wages when
all the immigrants arrive as skilled workers. The long-run changes in wages are the same for a
completely elastic and an endogenously determined capital supply–capital dilution aﬀects the
former not at all, and the latter only in the short-run. Indeed the long-run drops in skilled
wages and increases in unskilled wages are nearly symmetric in this particular example, ranging
from nine-tenths of a percent when the elasticity of substitution between the two types of labor
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Nested CES Production Function, sUK=sUS=1.67, sSK=.67
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is at its highest value, to approximately 1.8% when the elasticity of substitution is lowest.
If the supply of capital is fixed or grows at a fixed rate, capital dilution is permanent. As
long as all the elasticities of substitution are identical (as in Figures 9 and 10 in the Appendix),
capital dilution’s eﬀect on skilled and unskilled wages is the same: each drops by one half or
three-quarters of a percent, depending on whether the elasticity of substitution is one or .67.
If the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labor is raised to 1.67, capital
dilution generates a much larger drop in both the short and long-run wages of skilled workers,
as their labor complements the capital that is now relatively more scarce. Hence the permanent
rise in wages for unskilled workers is only four-tenths of a percent, while the drop in the wages
of skilled workers is 2.3%.
8.2 The Discounted College Premium
As we have seen, a change in the rate of immigration does not change the wage structure
overnight. A shift in policy means a change in the flow of immigrants that gradually alters the
size and composition of the workforce. In addition, the economy does not necessarily adjust im-
mediately to these changes. Unless the amount of capital adjusts immediately or is permanently
fixed, a surge of immigration will generate an initial shock to the savings rate, followed by the
gradual convergence of the size of the capital stock to its new steady-state level. Finally, immi-
grants themselves, or at least their descendants, may not permanently remain within their initial
skill categories, generating further disturbances to wages long after the surge in immigration
has subsided.
The impact of immigration on wage inequality must reflect the behavior of wages over time.
Encapsulating this behavior into a number requires us to discount by the rate of return available
to these workers, and this rate of return is just as sensitive to immigration policy as the wages
themselves, unless we assume from the outset that the capital supply is perfectly elastic and
that its rate of return is determined exogenously.
The need to take into account the endogeneity of the discount rate is apparent if we compare
the time paths of wages in Figures 4 and 5 to the behavior of the discounted college premium in
Table 2. The time paths of wages when capital supply is endogenously determined, fall between
the two extreme cases of completely elastic or inelastic capital supply, and closer to the former
than the latter. By contrast, the eﬀect of immigration on the discounted college premium does
not necessarily follow this pattern.
The first column of Table 2 illustrates the eﬀect of the immigration surge on the discounted
college premium, if all the additional immigrants are and remain unskilled workers. The new
policy implies that the premium will rise from an initial value of 170% to anywhere from 170.87%
to 172.17%, depending on what we assume about the elasticity of capital supply and, more
importantly, about the elasticity of substitution between the factors of production. Changes in
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inequality of this magnitude might appear small, but considering the magnitude of the change
in policy–a rise in the immigration rate of a mere three per ten thousand during twenty years–
even the smallest of these changes are quite impressive.
Even more impressive is the eﬀect of the immigration surge when it is comprised wholly
of skilled workers, as in the last column of Table 2. The small rise in the number of skilled
immigrants over the course of twenty years has the potential to lower the value of SP from 170%
to 166.52% if capital is supplied endogenously, and capital and skill are relative complements.
The drop in the discounted skill premium is even larger under nearly all the other scenarios in
Table 2.
It is important to keep in mind that the number of additional skilled immigrants who arrive
under the policy considered here is approximately seventy-five thousand per year. This number
is similar to the sixty-five thousand visas available under the H1-B visa program through most
of the years of its existence, and gives us some idea of what that program’s impact on wage
inequality might be. How robust are these results? The impact of a surge of skilled immigration
of this magnitude might cause a much smaller drop in the value of SP–perhaps from 170% to
169%–but only if the elasticities of substitution between the diﬀerent inputs are very high (in
this model close to five).
In the middle column of Table 2–ΠS (T ) = ΠS (V ) = PS (0)–the distribution of skills
among the immigrants exactly replicates that of the general population. As long as the cross
elasticities of substitution are equal across the diﬀerent inputs, such an influx of immigration has
no eﬀect on the college premium. Even if the supply of capital is not perfectly elastic, capital
dilution causes both types of wages to drop by the same proportion. Only if the elasticities are
not equal and capital supply is not completely elastic can a surge in immigration of this type
lead to a change in the discounted skill premium.
The third to last row of Table 2, in the middle column, combines the nested CES production
function and fixed capital supply for a surge of immigration whose rates of college attainment
match those of the general public. This entry isolates the eﬀect of capital dilution on the
discounted college premium–at most a drop from 170% to 169.38%. A rise in immigration
lowers wages for everyone because everyone’s labor complements capital. However the higher
degree of complementarity between skilled labor and the factor of production that is being
diluted ensures that their wages decline more, and the wage premium declines. If capital is
endogenously determined, capital dilution is transitory and the eﬀect of the immigration surge
is smaller–the discounted wage premium is 169.89%.
8.3 Assessing the Impact of Skill Acquisition
The results in Table 2 reveal that a relatively small influx of unskilled immigrants substantially
raises the discounted college premium if these immigrants and their descendants remain perma-
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ΠS (T )= ΠS (V ) = 0 ΠS (T )= ΠS (V )= PS (0) ΠS (T )= ΠS (V ) = 1
Cobb Douglas: σUK = σUS = σSK = 1
Fixed Capital 171.45 170.00 165.89
Completely Elastic Capital 171.45 170.00 165.86
Endogenous Capital 171.45 170.00 165.76
CES: σUK = σUS = σSK = .67
Fixed Capital 172.16 170.00 163.91
Completely Elastic Capital 172.17 170.00 163.85
Endogenous Capital 172.16 170.00 163.67
Nested CES: σUK = σUS = 1.67, σSK = .67
Fixed Capital 170.87 169.38 165.20
Completely Elastic Capital 171.08 170.00 166.88
Endogenous Capital 171.05 169.89 166.52
Table 2: The values of the discounted skill premium SP , following a rise in the rate of immigration from
3.2 to 3.5 per thousand during the course of two decades. The baseline value of SP is 170%.
nently unskilled. A similar sized influx of skilled immigrants produces an opposite and much
larger change. How might these results change if the immigrants, or at least their descendants,
switch between the two skill categories? More specifically, how much can college attainment
by immigrants subsequent to their arrival in the United States as unskilled workers mitigate
or reverse their initial impact on wage inequality? How much does future college attainment
among the members of the second generation aﬀect the discounted college premium?
Suppose once again that the additional immigrants arrive initially as unskilled workers,
ΠS (T ) = 0, but over time a fraction of these immigrants or their children join the ranks of the
skilled, until ultimately the distribution between skilled and unskilled within this additional pop-
ulation matches that of the general population–ΠS (V ) = PS (0). As in the second columns of
Figures 4 and 5, we are again modeling a process of assimilation, at least in terms of educational
attainment. Table 3 illustrates the implications of this process on the discounted skill premium
for the nested CES specification of the production function, σUK = σUS = 1.67, σSK = .67. The
same calculations, with all the elasticities of substitution set equal to each other, are presented
in Tables 5 and 6 in the Appendix.
As should be expected, the values in Table 3 fall somewhere between the corresponding
entries in the first two columns of Table 2 (last three rows). The lower the values of Q and
V–the earlier the date at which the process of assimilation begins, and the earlier the date
at which it is completed–the closer the values of the discounted college premium are to the
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values in the second column of Table 2. Higher values of Q and V correspond to delayed and
extended periods of assimilation, and are closer to the higher values in the first column. As in
the second column of graphs in Figure 4 and 5, unskilled wages rise and skilled wages decline
starting in period Q. Even if Q is large, implying that only members of the second generation
attend college, assimilation mitigates in the long run the initial rise in inequality.
Compare the discounted college premium in Table 2 for the values ΠS (T ) = 0 and ΠS (V ) =
0, and the nested CES production function with their corresponding values in Table 3. If Q=20
and V=40, the discounted college premium in Table 3 is 170.26% if the supply of capital is
exogenously determined, and 170.64% if capital supply is perfectly elastic. The corresponding
values in Table 2 are 170.87% and 171.08%. The less elastic the supply of capital, the higher
the rate at which changes in wages that take place after time Q are discounted, and yet when
capital supply is inelastic it seems that the relative impact on the discounted college premium
is larger. Hence we conclude that the disproportional downward pressure on skill wages induced
by capital dilution dominates the higher discount rate.
The arrival of a small number of unskilled immigrants generates a significant rise in inequality
in Table 2, regardless of how the production function is specified, or the nature of the capital
supply. By contrast, an immigration surge that replicates the existing distribution of skills in the
general population, and the underlying immigration flow, slightly lowers the discounted college
premium if capital and skill are relative complements and the supply of capital is not completely
elastic. Hence a surge of immigration need not raise inequality, even if the immigrants and their
descendants merely match the skill distribution decades in the future, and in the meantime
increase the relative size of the unskilled workforce. Of course, only if as in the top part of
Table 3, the supply of capital is inelastic, and the process of assimilation begins soon after these
immigrants begin to arrive. Otherwise assimilation mitigates the eﬀects of immigration on the
value of SP , but cannot reverse it.
The values of the discounted college premium in Table 3 are far more sensitive to the value of
Q than to the value of V . The point at which the share of college educated people has returned
to its its initial value of PS (0) is not as important as how quickly the first immigrants begin their
transformation into skilled workers. This diﬀerence becomes even more obvious if we consider
a more radical degree of transformation on the part of the new immigrants.
What if unskilled immigrants, or their children, do not merely match the general level of
educational attainment but far surpass it? Again, consider the most extreme scenario: the
immigrants arrive initially as unskilled workers, ΠS (T ) = 0, but over time they or their children
all join the ranks of the skilled, ΠS (V ) = 1. In nearly every case the values of the discounted
skill premium in Table 4 (calculated for nested CES specification of the production function,
σUK = σUS = 1.67, σSK = .67) fall well below 170%. The same is true if the elasticities of
substitution are identical, as in Tables 7 and 8.
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Q = 0 Q = 10 Q = 20 Q = 30 Q = 40 Q = 50
Inelastic Capital
V = 20 169.38 169.71 * * * *
V = 30 169.63 169.92 170.13 * * *
V = 40 169.82 170.08 170.26 170.40 * *
V = 50 169.97 170.20 170.37 170.49 170.57 *
V = 60 170.09 170.30 170.45 170.55 170.63 170.69
Completely Elastic Capital
V = 20 170.00 170.24 * * * *
V = 30 170.18 170.39 170.54 * * *
V = 40 170.32 170.50 170.64 170.74 * *
V = 50 170.43 170.59 170.71 170.80 170.87 *
V = 60 170.52 170.67 170.77 170.85 170.91 170.95
Endogenous Capital
V = 20 169.93 170.18 * * * *
V = 30 170.11 170.34 170.49 * * *
V = 40 170.26 170.45 170.59 170.69 * *
V = 50 170.37 170.54 170.67 170.75 170.82 *
V = 60 170.46 170.61 170.72 170.80 170.86 170.90
Table 3: Nested CES specification of the production function: σUK=σUS=1.67, σSK=.67. The values of
the discounted skill premium SP , following a rise in the rate of immigration from 3.2 to 3.5 per thousand
during the course of two decades, for diﬀerent values of V and Q. The immigrants are initially unskilled
ΠS(T )=0, but beginning at time Q, some of these immigrants, or their descendants, become skilled
workers. By time V the share of skilled workers within this population stabilizes at ΠS(V )=PS(0) where
PS(0)=.256 is the prevailing share of skilled workers within the general population. The baseline value
of SP is 170%.
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Q = 0 Q = 10 Q = 20 Q = 30 Q = 40 Q = 50
Inelastic Capital
V = 20 165.20 166.46 * * * *
V = 30 166.14 167.26 168.08 * * *
V = 40 166.87 167.87 168.59 169.12 * *
V = 50 167.44 168.34 168.98 169.45 169.79 *
V = 60 167.90 168.70 169.28 169.69 169.99 170.21
Completely Elastic Capital
V = 20 166.88 167.79 * * * *
V = 30 167.57 168.37 168.97 * * *
V = 40 168.11 168.83 169.35 169.74 * *
V = 50 168.53 169.18 169.65 169.99 170.24 *
V = 60 168.87 169.45 169.88 170.18 170.40 170.57
Endogenous Capital
V = 20 166.64 167.63 * * * *
V = 30 167.38 168.24 168.86 * * *
V = 40 167.94 168.71 169.25 169.63 * *
V = 50 168.38 169.06 169.54 169.88 170.13 *
V = 60 168.73 169.34 169.77 170.07 170.29 170.46
Table 4: Nested CES specification of the production function: σUK=σUS=1.67, σSK=.67. The values of
the discounted skill premium SP , following a rise in the rate of immigration from 3.2 to 3.5 per thousand
during the course of two decades, for diﬀerent values of V and Q. The immigrants are initially unskilled
ΠS(T )=0, but beginning at time Q, all these immigrants, or their descendants, become skilled workers.
By time V the share of skilled workers within this population stabilizes at ΠS(V )=1. The baseline value
of SP is 170%.
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Consider the following scenario: a man and woman arrive in the United States at age twenty-
five, at the very beginning of the immigration surge, meet and start a family. Neither are college
educated and both spend the next forty years employed as unskilled workers. These parents
place a high value on education and all their American-born children complete college. The first
child graduates and joins the labor force perhaps twenty five years after the parents’ arrival.
Such a high level of college attainment among the second generation does not merely mitigate
the negative eﬀect on wage inequality of their immigrant parents’ decades of participation in the
labor force, but completely reverses it. Hence, admitting these two people into the United States
raises the college premium for thirty years, but seen from the perspective of several generations,
discounted by the economy’s prevailing rate of return, the arrival of this family has lowered
overall wage inequality.
9 Immigrant Groups and Wage Inequality
The simple examples of immigration surges in Section 8 are completely hypothetical and hardly
match the heterogeneity of the bi-generational patterns of educational attainment for the dif-
ferent U.S. immigrant groups in Figure 2. Compare for example the shares of college-educated
male immigrants to the United States from Poland and the Philippines, and their corresponding
second generations. A relatively small share of male immigrants from Poland aged 45 to 64
have college degrees–21.3% versus 25.6% for the overall U.S. population. However, a very large
fraction of American born sons aged 25 to 44 with Polish-born fathers have college degrees–
64.1%. Admitting Polish immigrants prior to 1975 raised the gap between the wages of skilled
and unskilled workers, but a generation later, the high levels of educational attainment achieved
by the second generation have had the opposite eﬀect on the skill premium.
Indeed, compare the experience of Polish immigrants over the course of two generations with
immigrants from the Philippines. The share of male immigrants from the Philippines aged 45
to 64 with college degrees is much higher–45.8%–but among second generation Americans
aged 25 to 44 with Philippine-born fathers, the share completing college is significantly lower
than for their Polish-American counterparts–only 42.3% (indeed, there is even some reversion
to the mean, as members of the second generation are less educated than members of the first).
How do we compare the impact of the entire experience of Philippine immigration, including
subsequent generations, with immigration from Poland?
Once again PS (0) is the initial steady-state share of college-educated people in the economy
prior to the change in policy. The initial share of college educated among the additional im-
migrants is ΠS (T ), and ΠS (V ) is the share of college educated among these same immigrants
or their descendants at time V . Starting at time Q, the share of skilled workers among these
additional dynasties begins changing (linearly) until the share of skilled workers among these
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same additional immigrants or their descendants is ΠS (V ).
I focus on the case of endogenously determined capital supply, and once again set  = .0003,
the value of T equal to twenty, the value of Q to twenty-five, and the value of V to forty-five, in
(23). I insert the resulting values of the perturbations into (24), and use these to calculate the
value of ξ in (25). Setting (19) to diﬀerent values of SP yields an implicit function in the values
ΠS (T ) and ΠS (V ). These implicit functions are represented as iso-curves in Figures 6–7,
corresponding to the Nested CES specification, with the initial steady state discount rate set at
.05 and .03 respectively (the Cobb-Douglas and CES production functions appear respectively in
Figures 11 and 12 in the Appendix). These curves are superimposed on the points representing
the intergenerational rates of college completion for diﬀerent immigrant groups in Figure 2.
What do we learn from Figures 6–7? First, though the function SP is a complicated non-
linear function, it appears nearly linear on the ΠS (T ) and ΠS (V ) plane. Second, the distances
between the iso-curves appear constant–changing the values of either ΠS (T ) or ΠS (V ) gener-
ates nearly linear changes in the value of the discounted college premium.
Each iso-curve that correspond to SP=170% bisects a plane between two regions–immigrant
groups with values of ΠS (T ) and ΠS (V ) that fall to the right of the curve lower the discounted
college premium, while those with values to the left of the curve raise it. In Figures 6–7
the curve corresponding to SP=170% passes to the left of the point (25.6,25.6). Therefore
even if both the immigrant and second generation fall below the general levels of educational
attainment, the discounted college premium may still decline because when capital and skill are
relative complements, capital dilution harms the wages of skilled workers more than it harms
the wages of the unskilled.15
A group of immigrants with a low value of ΠS (T ) but a high value of ΠS (V ) raise the ratio
between skilled and unskilled wages in the short run, but cause it to drop in the long-run. The
short-run eﬀect of ΠS (T ) is temporary, whereas the long-run eﬀect of ΠS (V ) in this model lasts
forever. On the other the long-run is discounted at a rate of return that varies (in response to
immigration policy) around five percent. The discounting dominates and the angles measured
between the iso-curves and the horizontal axis in Figure 6 (and Figures 11 and 12)– are above
45◦.
Consider the eﬀect of Greek immigrants on the values of SP in Figure 6. Among members
of the second generation, the rate of college completion is 59.60% for women against 42.91%
for men. Nonetheless, the very low levels of education among the women of the immigrant
15 In Figures 11 and 12 (see Appendix), the elasticities of substitution between all the inputs are equal, and
the iso-curve passes through the point (25.6,25.6), the value of PS (0). Again, a surge of immigration that merely
replicates the existing skill distribution has no eﬀect on the discounted discount premium, unless the elasticities
of substitution between the inputs are not equal. For example, if production is Cobb Douglas or CES the impact
of Italian women on the value of SP is slightly negative, rather than slightly positive, as in Figure 6.
34
generation, 3.62%, means that the combined eﬀect of the mother-daughter pair on the value of
SP is positive–they raise inequality, if only slightly. The male immigrant from Greece is more
likely to have a college degree (18.34%), though less likely than members of the population at
large. Combined with a higher-than-average rate of college attainment in the second generation,
the father-son pairs fall to the right of the SP = 170 iso-curve. Hence males as a group lower
inequality, and the combined eﬀect of all Greek immigrants, male and female, on the value of
the discounted college premium is close to neutral.
Indeed women (and their daughters) from Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Greece, and
Portugal, together with men from the Dominican Republic, all raise the value of SP even
though members of the second generation are better educated than the general population.
Female immigrants from Cuba and Ireland, and male immigrants from Greece, Italy, Poland,
and Portugal have lower rates of college completion than the general population, but the high
rates of college attainment for corresponding members of the second generation mean their
overall eﬀect on SP is negative.
The best educated group in our sample are Indian men. For the immigrant generation
82.62% have college degrees, and for members of the second generation this rises to 87.26%.
An additional 87,000 visas per year to members of this group over the course of twenty years
profoundly lowers the value of SP , to 167.24%. The next group, Chinese men, lowers the value
of SP to 168.03%.
Among the people in the sample born in the United States, the least educated are those
whose parents were born in Mexico or Puerto Rico. Only 6.68% of immigrant men from Mexico
have college degrees, and for American-born sons of Mexican-born fathers, the share with college
degrees is only 10.23%. These values generate a value of 170.7% for SP . The corresponding
figures for women, 3.98% and 12.21%, produce an SP of 170.8%. Overall, the values of SP for
men rise in the following order: India, China, U.S.S.R., U.K., Germany, Philippines, Ireland,
Canada, Colombia, Poland, Cuba, U.S., Italy, Greece, Portugal, Dominican Republic, Puerto
Rico, and Mexico. For women the order is China, India, U.S.S.R., Philippines, Poland, Canada,
Germany, Cuba, Ireland, U.S., Italy, U.K., Colombia, Greece, Dominican Republic, Puerto
Rico, Portugal, and Mexico.
If the production function is Cobb-Douglas or CES all the iso-curves shift outward, including
the curve corresponding to 170%. Women from the U.K, and Italy now fall to the left of
the curve; they now lower inequality in and economy without capital-skill complementarities
(Figures 11 and 12 in the Appendix). More generally, the specification of the production
function employed in Figure 6 implies a high rate of substitution between the two types of
labor. The lower the elasticity of substitution the closer together are the iso-curves and the more
sensitive is the value of SP to diﬀerent immigration surges. Consider setting all the elasticities
of substitution to .67 (Figure 12 in the Appendix). Raising the number of male immigrants by
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Figure 6: Nested CES production function: σUK = σUS = 1.67, σSK = .67. Iso-curves for the values
of Sp following a twenty year twenty-five percent rise in the rate of immigration. The baseline rate
of return of capital is set to .05, and Q=25 and V =45. Points represent the percentage of the U.S.
population with four-year college degrees by age, sex, birthplace, and parent’s birthplace from Figure 2.
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Figure 7: Nested CES production function: σUK = σUS = 1.67, σSK = .67. Iso-curves for the values
of Sp following a twenty year twenty-five percent rise in the rate of immigration. The baseline rate
of return of capital is set to .03, and Q=25 and V =45. Points represent the percentage of the U.S.
population with four-year college degrees by age, sex, birthplace, and parent’s birthplace from Figure 2.
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seventy-five thousand per year for two decades lowers the value of SP to 165.02%. At the other
end of the ordinal ranking, the arrival of the same number of Mexican women to the United
States raises the value of SP to 171.50%.
Changing the initial discount rate to .03 changes the shapes and not merely the placement
of the iso-curves in Figure 7. The angles measured between the iso-curves and the horizontal
axis drops below 45◦, because the rate of educational attainment in the future designated by
ΠS (V ), is no longer as heavily discounted. This creates a new ranking for some of the immigrant
groups. The values of SP for men rise starting with India, and moving through China, U.S.S.R.,
U.K., Germany, Ireland, Philippines, Poland, Colombia, Canada, Italy, Cuba, Greece, Portugal,
U.S., Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Mexico. For women the order is: China, India,
U.S.S.R., Poland, Philippines, Germany, Ireland, Canada, Greece, Cuba, Italy, Colombia, U.K.,
U.S., Dominican Republic, Portugal, Puerto Rico, and Mexico.
Comparing these two lists to those obtained under the higher discount rate for men, the
order of the first five, India, China, U.S.S.R., U.K., and Germany, does not change; nor does the
order of the last three, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Mexico. Ireland and Philippines
switch places at positions six and seven–the rates of college attainment for second generation
members of the Irish community displace the higher rates of college attainment of Philippine
immigrants. Colombia remains in ninth place, but eighth-placed Canada switches with tenth-
placed Poland. Of the remaining countries, Italy jumps two places to number eleven, and Greece
and Portugal each rise by one place, to thirteen and fourteen respectively. Cuba drops by one
place to number twelve, and the U.S. drops three places to fifteen.
The shifts between the diﬀerent countries are more pronounced for the women in the sample–
only six, India, China, U.S.S.R., at the beginning, Italy and Dominican Republic in the middle,
and Mexico at the end of the list maintain their positions. The lowering of the discount rate
has a particularly large impact on the position of Greek women–they rise from fourteenth to
ninth place. Furthermore, they no longer raise the value of SP even slightly; with the lower dis-
count rate these women lower the value of SP . In summary, those immigrant groups with stable
intergenerational rates of college attainment (those closest to the 45◦) have the same eﬀect on
the discounted college premium, regardless of which discount rate is employed in the calibration
of the model. However, for the immigrant groups that experience large changes between the
immigrant and second generations, the discount rate is an important factor in determining their
overall impact.
Four important caveats. First, in this model there are only two skill types. Although
educational attainment is by necessity a discrete variable in empirical studies, ordinarily there
are more than just two categories. Second, in order to keep the model tractable, I do not treat
educational attainment as a choice made by either the immigrants or the other individuals in the
economy. Third, I abstract from the important distinction Chiswick (1978) found for the eﬀect
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of additional schooling prior to immigration and after immigration for immigrant men’s earnings
in the United States. Here a college degree from China is equivalent to a college degree attained
in the United States. Finally, I assume that once immigrant groups have achieved a level of
college education at time V , this remains their permanent level from there on in. This means
not only that a disproportionate number of immigrants from India and China arrive with college
degrees, and that the rates of college graduation among members of the second generations are
even higher, but that subsequent generations do not ‘assimilate’ by lowering their educational
performance.
10 Conclusion
Countries throughout the developed world find themselves grappling with the question of immi-
gration. The combination of declining birth rates and increased life-span is already raising the
average age of citizens throughout the west, and increasing substantially the share of pensioners
within the population. The ability of governments to maintain generous systems of old-age
pensions in now in serious doubt. Some see more liberal immigration policies as a possible
alternative to raising minimum retirement ages, slashing benefits, or raising the tax burden
on the dwindling population of native younger workers (see Auerbach and Oreopoulos (1999),
Storesletten (2000), and Fehr et. al. (2004)). This paper abstracts from the motivations for
higher rates of immigration, instead focusing on its consequences for wage inequality, both in
the short and long term.
The traditional immigration-absorbing countries, the United States, Canada, and Australia,
presently implement programs that grant residence to carefully selected foreigners with at least
a Baccalaureate degree and a marketable skill. Increasingly other countries, including Germany
and the United Kingdom, are also considering programs that target highly-skilled engineers
and scientists. At the same time, as traditional source countries, particularly in Asia, develop
and opportunities there grow, perhaps fewer engineers and scientists will choose to permanently
leave their homelands. Although there is still a vast pool of well educated people willing to
move to the West, competition between Western countries to attract them may intensify in the
future.
By contrast, the supply of unskilled immigrants–from the most impoverished and unstable
countries in the world, and even from those portions of the world experiencing rapid growth–is
enormous and may even grow during the next few decades. First, the cost of long-distance
travel is likely to continue to decline. Second, the wages paid to unskilled workers in the poorest
countries are not likely to move anywhere near the wages available in the developed world for
the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the spread of mass communication in recent years has
greatly raised awareness among inhabitants of poor countries about standards of living in the
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West. Finally, whereas once international migration entailed the near complete severing of ties
to family and culture, the telecommunications revolution of the past two decades now allows
migrants to retain links to their homeland by telephone, internet, and satellite television. Given
these factors, Western countries need only relax their present interdiction eﬀorts among illegal
immigrants and they can receive nearly any influx of low-skilled workers they want. The only
question is how many do they want?
A surge in the number of unskilled immigrants will at least initially exacerbate wage inequal-
ity. In countries with a strong commitment to income equality, governments may find themselves
spending relatively less on old-age pensions, but more on other types of transfer payments. Can
assimilation or enhanced educational attainment by members of the second generation amelio-
rate these eﬀects? Since few unskilled adult immigrants attend school after arriving in their
new home, their absorption typically entails a rise in the share of unskilled workers in the labor
force until the end of their working lives. Nonetheless a rise in unskilled immigration today need
not imply the creation of a self-perpetuating community of unskilled workers for generations to
come and a permanent rise in the wage gap.
As I have demonstrated, the disproportionate share of unskilled workers among certain
immigrant groups that arrived in the United States a generation ago did not necessarily cause
wage inequality, if we compare the ratio of discounted wages over time. The eﬀect of high levels
of educational attainment among the members of the second generation can easily overwhelm
the low levels of education that often characterize the immigrant generation.
What is the likely impact of immigration to the United States today? Consider the results
in Figure 8. The horizontal axis is the same as the horizontal axis in Figure 2, but I replace the
vertical axis with U.S.-born and young immigrants that arrived after 1975. The large changes
are mostly towards greater shares of college education. The most noticeable improvements are
among Canadian and Italian men, women from Ireland, and both men and women from Greece.
Overall the men are reasonably close to the 45◦. We cannot predict the rates of educational
attainment among members of the second generation, twenty-five years hence, but perhaps the
patterns in Figure 2 oﬀer some clue. Similarly, the methods developed here for calculating the
discounted skill premium provide some guidance for determining how these immigrants and their
families will aﬀect wage inequality in the future.
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Figure 8: Percentage of the U.S. population with four-year college degrees by age, sex, and birthplace.
Data for the USSR includes all respndents from any of the former republics in the sample, the data for
the UK includes respondents from Northern Ireland, and data for Portugal includes respondents from the
Azores. Pooled data for 2001, 2002, and 2003 from the U.S. Census, Current Population Survey. Source:
Miriam King, Steven Ruggles, and Matthew Sobek. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current
Population Survey: Preliminary Version 0.1. Minneapolis: Minnesota Population Center, University of
Minnesota, 2003.
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11 Appendix—Cobb Douglas and CES Production
Figure 9: Cobb-Douglas and CES production functions. Impulse response for unskilled wages following
a twenty year surge in the rate of immigration from 3.2 to 3.5 per thousand, Q=25 and V=45. The
solid, dashed, and dotted curves represent respectively, the impulse responses generated by the model
with capital supply that is elastic, completely elastic, and inelastic.
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Figure 10: Cobb-Douglas and CES production functions. Impulse response for skilled wages following
a twenty year surge in the rate of immigration from 3.2 to 3.5 per thousand, Q=25 and V=45. The
solid, dashed, and dotted curves represent respectively, the impulse responses generated by the model
with capital supply that is elastic, completely elastic, and inelastic.
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Q = 0 Q = 10 Q = 20 Q = 30 Q = 40 Q = 50
Inelastic Capital
V = 20 170.00 170.32 * * * *
V = 30 170.24 170.52 170.73 * * *
V = 40 170.43 170.68 170.86 170.99 * *
V = 50 170.57 170.80 170.96 171.08 171.16 *
V = 60 170.69 170.89 171.04 171.14 171.22 171.27
Completely Elastic Capital
V = 20 170.00 170.31 * * * *
V = 30 170.24 170.52 170.72 * * *
V = 40 170.43 170.67 170.86 170.99 * *
V = 50 170.57 170.80 170.96 171.07 171.16 *
V = 60 170.69 170.89 171.04 171.14 171.22 171.27
Endogenous Capital
V = 20 170.00 170.31 * * * *
V = 30 170.24 170.51 170.71 * * *
V = 40 170.42 170.66 170.84 170.97 * *
V = 50 170.56 170.78 170.94 171.05 171.14 *
V = 60 170.68 170.88 171.02 171.12 171.19 171.25
Table 5: Cobb-Douglas Production Function: σUK=σUS=σSK=1. The values of the discounted skill
premium SP , following a rise in the rate of immigration from 3.2 to 3.5 per thousand during the course
of two decades, for diﬀerent values of V and Q. The immigrants are initially unskilled ΠS(T )=0, but
beginning at time Q, some of these immigrants, or their descendants, become skilled workers. By time V
the share of skilled workers within this population stabilizes at ΠS(V )=PS(0) where PS(0)=.256 is the
prevailing share of skilled workers within the general population. The baseline value of SP is 170%.
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Q = 0 Q = 10 Q = 20 Q = 30 Q = 40 Q = 50
Inelastic Capital
V = 20 170.00 170.47 * * * *
V = 30 170.36 170.78 171.09 * * *
V = 40 170.64 171.01 171.28 171.48 * *
V = 50 170.86 171.19 171.43 171.61 171.74 *
V = 60 171.03 171.33 171.55 171.70 171.82 171.90
Completely Elastic Capital
V = 20 170.00 170.47 * * * *
V = 30 170.36 170.77 171.08 * * *
V = 40 170.64 171.01 171.28 171.48 * *
V = 50 170.86 171.19 171.43 171.61 171.73 *
V = 60 171.03 171.33 171.55 171.70 171.82 171.90
Endogenous Capital
V = 20 170.00 170.46 * * * *
V = 30 170.35 170.76 171.06 * * *
V = 40 170.63 170.99 171.25 171.45 * *
V = 50 170.84 171.17 171.40 171.57 171.70 *
V = 60 171.01 171.31 171.52 171.67 171.78 171.86
Table 6: CES Production Function: σUK=σUS=σSK=.67. The values of the discounted skill premium
SP , following a rise in the rate of immigration from 3.2 to 3.5 per thousand during the course of two
decades, for diﬀerent values of V and Q. The immigrants are initially unskilled ΠS(T )=0, but beginning
at time Q, some of these immigrants, or their descendants, become skilled workers. By time V the share
of skilled workers within this population stabilizes at ΠS(V )=PS(0) where PS(0)=.256 is the prevailing
share of skilled workers within the general population. The baseline value of SP is 170%.
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Q = 0 Q = 10 Q = 20 Q = 30 Q = 40 Q = 50
Inelastic Capital
V = 20 165.88 167.11 * * * *
V = 30 166.81 167.89 168.68 * * *
V = 40 167.52 168.49 169.19 169.70 * *
V = 50 168.08 168.95 169.57 170.03 170.36 *
V = 60 168.52 169.31 169.87 170.28 170.57 170.78
Completely Elastic Capital
V = 20 165.86 167.06 * * * *
V = 30 166.77 167.85 168.64 * * *
V = 40 167.49 168.45 169.15 169.66 * *
V = 50 168.05 168.91 169.54 169.99 170.33 *
V = 60 168.50 169.28 169.84 170.25 170.54 170.76
Endogenous Capital
V = 20 165.75 166.97 * * * *
V = 30 166.68 167.76 168.54 * * *
V = 40 167.40 168.36 169.05 169.57 * *
V = 50 167.97 168.83 169.45 169.90 170.23 *
V = 60 168.42 169.19 169.75 170.15 170.44 170.66
Table 7: Cobb-Douglas Production Function: σUK=σUS=σSK=1. The values of the discounted skill
premium SP , following a rise in the rate of immigration from 3.2 to 3.5 per thousand during the course
of two decades, for diﬀerent values of V and Q. The immigrants are initially unskilled ΠS(T )=0, but
beginning at time Q, all these immigrants, or their descendants, become skilled workers. By time V the
share of skilled workers within this population stabilizes at ΠS(V )=1. The baseline value of SP is 170%.
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Q = 0 Q = 10 Q = 20 Q = 30 Q = 40 Q = 50
Inelastic Capital
V = 20 163.90 165.73 * * * *
V = 30 165.27 166.89 168.08 * * *
V = 40 166.33 167.77 168.82 169.59 * *
V = 50 167.16 168.46 169.39 170.07 170.56 *
V = 60 167.82 168.99 169.83 170.43 170.87 171.19
Completely Elastic Capital
V = 20 163.84 165.63 * * * *
V = 30 165.20 166.79 167.97 * * *
V = 40 166.26 167.68 168.73 169.50 * *
V = 50 167.09 168.38 169.31 169.99 170.49 *
V = 60 167.76 168.92 169.76 170.37 170.81 171.14
Endogenous Capital
V = 20 163.66 165.48 * * * *
V = 30 165.05 166.65 167.83 * * *
V = 40 166.13 167.55 168.59 169.35 * *
V = 50 166.97 168.25 169.17 169.85 170.34 *
V = 60 167.64 168.79 169.62 170.22 170.66 170.98
Table 8: CES Production Function: σUK=σUS=σSK=.67. The values of the discounted skill premium
SP , following a rise in the rate of immigration from 3.2 to 3.5 per thousand during the course of two
decades, for diﬀerent values of V and Q. The immigrants are initially unskilled ΠS(T )=0, but beginning
at time Q, all these immigrants, or their descendants, become skilled workers. By time V the share of
skilled workers within this population stabilizes at ΠS(V )=1. The baseline value of SP is 170%.
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Figure 11: Cobb-Douglas production function: σUK = σUS = σSK = 1. Iso-curves for the values of
Sp following a twenty year twenty-five percent rise in the rate of immigration. The baseline rate of return
of capital is set to .05, and Q=25 and V =45. Points represent the percentage of the U.S. population
with four-year college degrees by age, sex, birthplace, and parent’s birthplace from Figure 2.
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Figure 12: CES production function: σUK=σUS=σSK=.67. Iso-curves for the values of Sp following
a twenty year twenty-five percent rise in the rate of immigration. The baseline rate of return of capital is
set to .05, and Q=25 and V =45. Points represent the percentage of the U.S. population with four-year
college degrees by age, sex, birthplace, and parent’s birthplace from Figure 2.
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